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Summary
The paper starts by considering problems in the definition and
measurement of political issues -in particular, whether issue-creation involves all
parties and both leadership and electors; or whether issues can be "created" by only
one of these. Confrontational approaches to the handling of issues are contrasted
with saliency theories. The choice of a conceptual approach affects the way issues
and change are measured and represented, whether this is done through typologies
or by spatial analysis of party movements.
Spatial analysis presents two possibilities in regard to issue change: parties
may change positions over time within the space; but the space itself (defined in
terms of issues relevant at each time-point) may change. Both are considered on the
basis of codings of sentences in party election programmes across a number of
democracies, since the war. This is supplemented by trends in newspaper reports of
campaign issues over the same period, which seem to indicate that, in the long term,
issues are generated by the objective problems facing governments at the time. The
discussion ends by briefly considering consequences of issues for government
formation and action, and how far commitments to take action on issues are put into
effect, as party mandate theory would imply.
The question of issue change is so vast, extending from party competition
and government change through media and communication studies to election
studies and voting behaviour, that it is narrowed down here to comparative research
done over the last 15 years on party interrelationships in elections and governments,
in roughly the same group of-democracies -Western Europe, North America,
Australasia, Japan and Israel. Within these constants a variety of data -surveys,
documents, reported events- have been used and analysed by various techniques,
including spatial analysis. The distinction between party leaders and electors has
always been central and where possible their mutual influence on each other has
been examined.
Use of different sources, techniques and subjects for analysis throws into
relief questions usually neglected at a purely abstract level -such as: how do we
identify issues in the first place?- and how do we put them into the same frame of
analysis for comparative purposes? These are the first questions the paper takes up,
before going on to more theoretical points, (which still affect measurement and
operationalisation however).
1. DEFINING ISSUES
While it is possible to think of issues being defined and discussed
independently of political parties (in the media for example) they are for purposes of
political analysis usually related to what the parties say and do. What do we mean by
parties however? -leadership or electoral base or both? Bearing in mind this potential
ambiguity we could define an issue variously as:
a) a point "at issue" or anyway discussed by all parties, so that in terms of a
spatial analysis the concurrence of all is necessary to define the space,
b) a point or topic emphasised by only one of the parties (each can
contribute independently to defining any space, so that a dimension of concern to
one may not interest another -this has consequences for the kind of metric one might
want to use in measuring distances within a space)
c) a point or topic or "position", whether or not stressed by leaders,
important in:
i) defining party support among electors (in which case it could presumably
include the "permanent issues" of class, religion, ethnicity or urban-rural divisions
stressed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) or
ii) moving support between the parties -a narrower and more dynamic
concept, within which issues are more likely to be short term.
These are very different conceptions with strong bearings on what one
might identify as issues and therefore how one might identify change in relation to
them. There is little basis for deciding in the abstract which definition is better:
presumably it all depends on one's research purposes. As my interest has been
primarily in the interaction of issues as defined by the party leadership with those
important in consolidating party support among electors (and sometimes in moving
electors between parties) I would want to be as inclusive as possible and define
issues as topics raised by one or more party leaderships and/or important among
electors. Part of the research interest then lies in estimating the extent to which
issues defined in each of these ways coincide, not simply assuming that they do as in
most theories of the Downsian tradition (Downs, 1957). In discussing issues in this
sense it is important, obviously, to specify their provenance and source (in which
party leadership and/or electorate do they originate or exert influence for example?).
2. DOCUMENTING ISSUES AND TRACKING CHANGE
In tracking issues one may draw on various data-sources. Again what one
discovers is fairly heavily dependent on the source used, so it is worthwhile to
comment briefly on these in passing:
a) By far the commonest source for identifying issues are election surveys
-indeed so common are they that many analysts use surveys with the implicit
assumption that their questions define the universe of issues that existed for a given
election. While these questions usually represent the best guesses of the
investigators about what would be issues at a point 2-3 months before the election,
they are informed guesses by experts using polls and similar sources as evidence.
Surveys have two other features. One is that certain questions get carried on from
previous years because of a long term interest in electors' reactions to them, not
because they were necessarily prominent in that particular election. The other is that
electors are often invited to talk about politics generally, in response to "open"
questions, though so far as I know no one has ever used this issue material to check
on the "closed" questions included by the designers of the questionnaire.
b) An alternative source for tracing issues are media descriptions and
analyses, especially as summarized in compendia like "Keesing's Contemporary
Archives" or in retrospective accounts of campaigns like the Nuffield General Election
Series in Britain; the Making of the President or the Enterprise Research Institute
series in the USA; dealing with elections in a variety of countries. Media accounts are
clearly biased by the position of the observers and are unlikely to be based on any
very systematic sampling of opinions. Nevertheless they do comprehend the whole
campaign and reflect opinions and events both at elite and electoral levels in a way
no other source does.
c) One can also base oneself on party documents, particularly the election
programmes (in the US the "platforms") of the parties. Though these are directed at
electors they clearly originate with the leadership and reflect its opinions or
strategies. They are also written at varying times before the campaign opens and in
many countries are read by few electors. As against this they are read by
commentators and media people, who use them as a basis from which to begin their
discussions. In this indirect way they reach the general public and shape many of the
themes of the campaign. They thus constitute a major source for the analysis of
issues change (Sections 6-8 below).
d) One should also mention legislative sources and proceedings, such as
roll calls, bills and other outputs and debates. These differ from the sources
mentioned above in that they are non electoral, falling generally between campaigns.
They tell you a lot about the questions which preoccupy party leaderships at a
particular point in time: these often of course precipitate the fall and rise of
governments and could provide issue-information highly relevant to coalition-
formation. In theory such information could also be related to polling information
about electoral opinions.
Clearly the different source-materials may give rather different pictures of
what issues are relevant at any one point in time. An attempt at comparing
judgements based on surveys, media and party documents for the 1960 Presidential
election in the US and the 1964 General Elections in Britain is made in Tables 1 and
2.
Obviously themes culled from each of the sources often coincide: when
they do they are listed on the same line, parallel to the corresponding issue among
electors as ascertained from survey sources (column 4). Some themes stressed by
politicians were not asked in surveys (presumably because their resonance among
electors was not apparent). Some survey questions which divided electors very
effectively into partisan groups were not stressed at all by politicians according to our
sources, e.g. for Britain in 1964, the question of entry to the Common Market. These
are listed in column 5 of the tables. It will be noted that only one trivial issue appears
in this column for the U.S. in 1960, as compared to three issues of some weight for
Britain in 1964. This contrast holds generally for British and American elections.
Generally in the United States for all elections examined, all issues could be seen as
originating with leaders. For Britain most do, but there are usually two or three
questions, important and divisive among electors, about which leaders seem to have
said nothing.
Two additional aspects of leaders' influence on electors need to be noted.
First politicians must be credited with putting up particular Presidential and Prime
Ministerial candidates, who make some impact on electors. Candidate reactions are
therefore listed in both tables at the top of column 4 as an effect attributable to
leaders' cues. Secondly, leaders can at times give considerable weight to
long-standing issues (such as nationalisation in Britain) which are not very prominent
among electors.
In spite of discrepancies between leaders and electors and between
sources, there is perhaps more convergence on characterisations of issues in these
Tables than one might have expected. So far as I know no one has done a
systematic comparison of this kind over an extended series of elections. This simple
validation is obviously a first step to be undertaken in a more comprehensive study of
issue change. The encouraging results of the limited comparisons for 1960 and 1964
encourage some substitution of one source for another in the general tracking of
issues, though it also appears from the Tables that leaders are likely to nominate
many more issues than electors actually take up.
3. HOW DO ELECTORS AND PARTIES REACT TO ISSUES-CONFRONTATION
VERSUS SALIENCY
The way in which parties and electors react to issues has considerable
implications for the way we measure them. The conventional picture of party
competition is one in which the parties endorse opposing positions on the same set
of issues; and electors estimate the agreement between their own position and those
of the parties and vote for the alternative which is closest. This kind of picture is very
familiar from Downs' classic treatment (Downs, 1957) and from the many spatial
analyses in the Downsian tradition.
However when one actually studies electoral programmes it is hard to find
much evidence for confrontation, at least at the leadership level. If one examines the
number of references to other parties it is on average about 10 per cent of all
sentences in the documents and party-related issue references are even lower –
about 5 per cent. Clearly this minority of sentences does not contain the main thrust
of what is being said -which we must take as the party leaderships' attempt to attract
electors to vote for them (Budge, Robertson, Hearl, eds., 1987, pp. 389-391).
What do these documents contain? For the most part assertions of the
importance of various problems (unemployment, social services, strong defence, law
and order, the erosion of freedom, the environment, etc. etc.)… in the form of rather
rambling analyses of past history and of the current state of affairs, with a view to
stressing the urgency of action in the particular area. These analyses do not give
great prominence to other parties or what they have done. But they do talk a lot
about the originating party's record and attitudes.
The importance of party documents of this kind is that, unlike survey
questionnaires or media reports, they come directly and unmediated from
participants in the struggle for votes. They must therefore be taken as direct evidence
for the way parties handle issues and for the way in which the leadership at any rate
thinks electors will react.
How do they think of issues in this context? Clearly not primarily as direct
confrontation, since so few of their references are dedicated to contrasting party
policies. Rather they seem to be engaged in stressing the priority of certain topics,
which they discuss at great length, in comparison with others, which they discuss in
passing or hardly at all.
Why should parties present themselves in this way? It seems that party
leaders have a picture of the way electors react to parties which differs somewhat
from the one prevalent among survey analysts. Party leaders stress certain issues
more than others because they think they would benefit if those they favour become
prominent in the campaign. This in turn seems to assume an almost automatic
linkage between the prominence of a certain type of issue and party advantage (in
terms of votes).
The most plausible explanation of why politicians present themselves in this
way, is that they endorse a "saliency" rather than a confrontational theory of voting.
They think that the majority of electors see different parties as having the obviously
"correct" policy for particular areas. Thus "left" or reformist parties will expand social
services; right wing parties will be tough on offenders in the field of law and order; left
or reformist parties will generally intervene more where intervention is needed; while
right wing parties are more likely to reduce government activity and implement tax
cuts.
There seems little doubt in politicians' minds about most electors endorsing
one "obvious" course of action in each area and clearly identifying the party most
likely to carry it through. In view of this, they seem to think that elections will be won
by the party most of whose proprietary issues assume prominence in the election.
So, much party effort seems to be devoted to making "their" issues prominent and
down playing those of the opposition. (For a similar interpretation of issues effects,
which he terms the dominance principle, see W.H. Rikers's discussion in Riker, ed.
1922, Chaps. 1 and 2).
These tendencies are reinforced by the difficulty parties have in dissociating
themselves from their own history and actions in government, which give them an
indelible association with certain policy stances. This implies in turn that they are able
to shift their policy positions only gradually, so they are far from enjoying unlimited
mobility over the entire policy field. Clearly again they must find it difficult to leapfrog
as it would be quite impossible for a Labour party to pretend it was more
conservative than the Conservatives. They would lose many longstanding supporters
to no avail as nobody would believe they had changed radically in any case.
All this has considerable implications for the way one operationalises and
codes issues, pointing to the importance of the space or attention devoted to a topic,
rather than the nuances of what is said about it. And in fact one striking empirical
finding in coding party documents is that remarks about any area are usually of one
kind. One does not discuss defence for example to attack military expenditure but
only to support it. The same goes for social services.
Proof for the assertions of saliency theory comes above all from the very
plausible results, including spatial maps, obtained when one applies it to
documentary data (Robertson, 1976; Budge and Farlie, 1977, Chap. 12; Budge,
Robertson, Hearl, eds. 1987). This supports the general impression you have from
reading party documents or following political discussions in the media, that party
spokesmen rather than discussing a problem (say crime) on some common ground,
will switch: the more right-wing emphasises conventional law and order, the more
reformist the fact that crime breeds in poor social conditions, which call for more
intervention and services.
One further piece of specific evidence, apart from the low rate of
programmatic references to other parties and their issue-positions, is the fact that
specific commitments and pledges are so limited in party documents and confined
almost exclusively to marginal areas (Rallings, 1987). One simply cannot code and
election platform in terms of specific stands without throwing away most of the
material: but surely everything that is written has some purpose? If so, saliency
theory is the only explanation that makes sense of 90% of the sentences in the
election programmes.
4. CHARACTERISING ISSUE POSITIONS; SCORES AND TYPOLOGIES
It is possible to characterise party and electoral positions by simply recording
stances on every conceivable issues. For most purposes however one needs to
summarise and estimate the overall issue position. This is particularly necessary
when one wants to estimate distances between parties, and between parties and
electors, to operationalise voting and coalition theories.
Again, there are a number of ways of doing this. It is salutary to reflect that
many -perhaps most- summary characterisations are not spatial in nature. I review
these here, going on in Section 5 to consider the spatial characterisations that may
be applied.
a) A first, heroic solution is to concentrate only on the most important issue
and characterise parties and electors in regard to that. (In terms of a saliency
characterisation this would be the contrast between each party's leading topics). A
specific example of this is where Budge and Keman (1990, p. 83) -partly from paucity
of data as well as from a desire to simplify-hypothesise that parties agreeing on the
most important issue would be more likely to enter into governmental coalition with
each other than those that did not, where no obvious structural impetus to coalition
existed. Given the difficulty of getting data from newspaper accounts, the hypothesis
had a fair degree of success: 58 per cent of relevant cases.
b) From the point of view of trying to predict the direction of vote in
elections, summary scores for each party may do very well. The simplest solution
was suggested by Kelley and Mirer (1974). For elegance and parsimony it has never
been bettered. They simply took advantage of the "open" questions about issues and
candidates included in practically all national election surveys, and added up positive
and negative references to each candidate algebraically (each counting one).
Electors were then postdicted to vote for the party with the highest score -a
characterisation which seemed to fit the data for the US very well.
c) More directly related to the discussion of issues as such, rather than
vote-prediction is the idea of typing specific issues into long term "clusters" or "areas"
as in Table 3. The advantage of doing so is that the "types" are relevant over all
elections whereas specific issues appear and disappear. In line with saliency ideas
one can assign most of these types to one party or another (in terms of their
prominence in an election causing a net inflow of votes to one of the parties).
Election failure or success can then be explained in terms of more of one parties'
issues than another's predominating at an election.
The advantage of such a characterisation is that it can be applied over all
elections for which newspaper accounts of prominent issues are available i.e. in
practice, over all elections in democracies since the second world war. Not only that,
it can be used to predict election results in advance on the basis of such accounts.
Predictions on this basis have had a fair degree of success (Budge and Farlie, 1983,
pp. 84-114). The advantage of this approach in the present context is that it can be
used to survey the incidence of issues of the various types in elections since the
war: Tables drawn from this study form in fact the centrepiece of Section 8 (Table 10
below).
5. SUMMARIZING ISSUE POSITIONS: DIMENSIONS AND SPATIAL ANALYSES
The power and flexibility of non-spatial analyses are much greater than is
commonly credited. But spatial analyses have well-known advantages of direct,
intuitive representation and openness, to mathematical analyses and formal
modelling, which render them very appealing. This is even truer of one-dimensional
representations which have the advantage, usually, of avoiding cyclical voting
problems. A pervasive problem with many analyses, however, has been that in their
eagerness to utilize the power of a spatial approach they have been unselfcritical
-even unconscious- of the operational assumptions necessary to produce it and on
which their results depend just as much as on the highly refined mathematical
postulates which they use explicitly (cf Budge and Keman, 1990, pp. 2130). This is
even more true when theoretical analysts have availed themselves of empirically
derived spaces, for there it is even clearer that what goes in determines what comes
our -and that is not always an issue-space! I illustrate these points below:
a) The commonest type of space used to explain and predict government
coalitions is a judgmentally derived Left-Right space, where country specialists have
been asked to order and space out parties along a continuum between (usually
undefined) Left and Right ends. Usually this puts communist and radical left parties
as well as extreme Right parties way out at each end of the line, so it is not hard to
predict that the coalition will form from those parties of the Centre which are closest
to each other. This kind of judgmental placement often leads to an implicit tautology.
It is difficult to specialists making this kind of judgement to confine themselves to
pure issue-stands (which they are often not very conscious of anyway). So quite
naturally, one of the most important factors entering into estimates of closeness is
parties' previous experience in government together. Distances at least partly based
on this are then used to predict future coalitions! The specialists might just as well
have been asked directly to say what parties would join in government, without going
through elaborate intervening procedures.
The other disadvantage of such "judgmental" spaces particularly relevant
for the current discussion, is that specialists cannot be retrospectively asked to
reconstruct party locations over a period in time, as judgements about one set of
positions tend to contaminate others. If experts have themselves been asked to
make estimates at different time-points and these recorded, then of course this
objection would not hold, though one would like to know that they had the same
understanding of Left and Right at each point.
b) Much the same objections apply to the kinds of space commonly
obtained by survey analysts in the early "70s, based on electors" rank-orderings of
the parties in terms of closeness to them. First, these are not clearly issue-spaces,
since who knows what may have influenced the judgements of closeness? And
secondly, since the nature of the dimensions is inferred from the positioning of
parties on them, rather than from independent evidence, any movement by the
parties changes the inferred nature of the dimensions, rendering it impossible to
trace party change within the same space (Budge and Farlie, 1978).
In the 1970s Farlie and Budge experimented with a "party defined" space,
derived either from issue-responses or social characteristics of party supporters or
both. This was based on Bayesian likelihood ratios and produced a space varying in
dimensionality with the number of parties (1-dimensional with 2 parties,
2-dimensional for three etc.). The ends were "pure party positions" which actual
parties could approach more or less closely but never attain. The space was used for
relating party positions, as defined by British manifestoes and US platforms, to
survey data on electors, with a view to checking Robertson's (1976) hypothesis on
party competition (Budge and Farlie, 1977, Chap. 11). There are obvious problems in
applying this representation to multi party systems however, as the space cannot be
represented directly with more than three parties. The demonstration that the odds
against the nearest Democratic and Republican platforms being mistaken for each
other are 200 to 1 does lend some force to the idea that parties rarely leap-frog and
keep close to their own segment of issue-space, in contradiction to Downsian ideas
of unlimited free movement.
d) The natural technique to apply to any scoring or issue positions, whether
survey or content-analytic in nature, is factor-analysis. Provided that the input does
relate to issues this will give you a policy-space as assumed by most theoretical
models. However the resulting space will differ from the pure issue space of free
party movement, assumed by most theories, as it will be one in which parties do not
and cannot venture into certain areas: it will be a policy space with certain parts
reserved to particular parties (Budge and Farlie, 1977). This should be borne in mind
with the factor-analytic spaces examined below.
Although the more or less straightforward factor-analytic spaces are the
main ones I use to trace issue-change below, two other approaches have been used,
particularly to examine coalition formation and relationships between party and
coalition policy (Laver and Budge, eds., 1922, Chap. 2).
e) A "forced" left-right dimension. Having drastically reduced our original 54
category coding of party programmes e.g. by leaving out thinly populated categories,
we combined those we thought intuitively belonged together as a left-right dimension
and checked this by factor analysis. Subsequently we put the "left-right" variable in
factor analyses with the remaining ones to see if any "fitted" with it across 12
countries. This was in a sense a "forced" dimension as we were using it to mop up all
of the variation in the data-set that we possibly could, being guided rather than
determined by the factor-analysis.
The dimension which we obtained opposed right-wing emphases on
"capitalist economics", "social conservatism", "freedom and domestic human rights",
and "support for military"; to left emphases on "State intervention", "peace and
co-operation", "democracy", "support for social services", "support for education", and
"support for labour". Left-right positions of parties were computed by subtracting
percentages of "leftist" references from percentages of "rightist" references.
f) No other general comparative dimension emerged from these data. This
meant that the forced left-right dimension was in some ways our best summary
representation of party positions (on a comparative basis). To catch the other
tendencies present in the data there was no alternative to using our (reduced) 20
variable coding framework as a whole -in effect a 20- dimensional representation of
the parties in issue space. This lost the advantage of concise presentation but did
allow us to form alternative estimates of distance between parties, which is all that is
necessary, for some theories at any rate, to make predictions of coalition
membership and policy. However the best metric for these measurements turned out
to be city block rather than Euclidian, a point that has considerable relevance for
formal modelling of issue spaces.
6. PARTY MOVEMENT WITHIN (LEADERSHIP) ISSUE-SPACES OBTAINED BY
FACTOR ANALYSES OF PARTY PROGRAMMES
If we were concerned only with changes of party position within issue spaces
which we could assume to be invariant for the whole postwar period, I would present
estimates of this, based on party electoral programmes, in terms of the last two
spaces described, as these are the latest to be evolved from our continuing analysis
of the programmatic data.
However change within a given space is not the only type of change with
which we should be concerned. There is also the question of whether the relevant
dimensions of the space are stable or themselves change at some point. It is not
unreasonable to think they do, given the political record of most countries in the
sixties an early seventies: the growth of new social movements since then; and the
impact of environmental considerations and detente in the 1980s. This can be
illustrated through Table 4, taken from an unpublished secondary analysis of the
election programmes of Hofferbert and Inglehart (1990) which shows interesting
correlations between post materialist issues and time. Use of the Right-Left
dimension or of an original coding frame, both made invariant by definition, confines
us to examining party changes of position within definitionally fixed parameters. So I
shall base discussion on our original two-stage factor analyses, based on 54
categories, into which were counted all sentences of all available electoral
programmes for all significant parties in 19 democracies for the postwar period. The
categories (Budge, Robertson Hearl, eds., Appendix B) are based on the saliency
ideas described in Section 3, rather than on coding directly opposing positions of
parties. Saliency ideas in turn gain some validity from the plausible results produced
by the factor analyses.
The major findings (Budge, Robertson, Hearl, eds., 1987, Chap. 18) were:
a) The optimal spaces for each country were never less than three
dimensional, and sometimes four or five dimensional. Generally, the leading
dimension, and less often the second, were generalisable across countries; the
others were country-specific.
b) In 14 out of 19 countries the leading dimension that emerged was
interpretable as a Left-Right one, broadly along the lines of the "forced" dimension
described above.
c) In 9 countries, of the 14 which generated a leading left-right dimension, a
second dimension emerged which could be interpreted in broad terms as a "New
Politics" dimension, where some concern with "new issues", particularly the
environment and democracy, is contasted with older emphases. Although we forced
orthogonality on the dimensions, an inspection of the two dimensional figures
produced in these cases shows that collapsing the space to one dimension still gives
a reasonable representation at least of the major parties, relative positions. This
explains the success of our "forced" left-right dimension which in some ways
combines these two sets of concerns.
A summary of these findings over all countries analysed is given in Table 5.
d) Although the nature of the dimensions is important to interpret what kind
of change is taking place, it is change itself we are concerned with -in this case the
movement of the parties over various points in these dimensions. For predicting
alliances or coalitions what is needed of course are the exact scores at each point in
time, which can hardly be presented here. A general interest is in the general
convergence or divergence of parties over the postwar period, particularly in view of
theses of the "end of ideology" (Bell, 1962) or of the emergence of the totally
pragmatic "catch-all" party (Kircheimer, 1966). In part, of course, judgements of
convergence and divergence rest on arbitrary decisions about which years to
compare. Inspection of individual graphs of party movement on the main dimension
shows that in most countries there is no steady movement to convergence or
divergence; parties come together and move apart presumably in response to
imperatives of party competition, not to secular trends towards de-ideologisation.
Taking party positions in the first postwar election and comparing it with the
last for which we have data (the early 80s) we get the results summarised in Table
6. In the limited sense used above most countries experienced convergence. The
extreme case is Italy (Figure 1) -curiously, as it is so often described in terms of
"polarised pluralism" with irresistible "centrifugal" tendencies (Sartori, 1972). In fact
in the latter period the tendency to convergence is so strong that it even produces
some leapfrogging which (exceptionally) goes against some of the points made
earlier. The results also illustrate the point that Communist parties are often close, in
policy terms, to the other parties in the system even though permanently excluded
from government coalitions. There are two footnotes to these findings which must be
stressed. One is that the factor analysis is of emphases on issues (as measured by
percentages of sentences falling into the categories). Thus convergence must be
interpreted as putting less stress on traditional issues, not taking up the same
positions on them. And of course these stresses are the party leaderships',
addressed to electors certainly, but not emanating from them and therefore not
necessarily reflecting their thinking. In the absence of more direct information one
might of course wish to use these documents as a surrogate indicator of electoral
opinion, but it is only a surrogate.
7. NEW DIMENSIONS AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE SPACE OF PARTY
COMPETITION
The findings presented in Section 6 rest on the assumption of an invariant
issue space over the postwar period, within which party emphasis and de-emphasis
of the issues take place. What if the space itself changes over this period however, in
terms of its politically important dimensions, making different issues relevant to party
relationships at different points in time? There are dramatic turning points in most
countries' political history which at least point to this possibility: the Bad Godesberg
conference and renunciation of Marxism by the SPD in Germany (1959), the Schools
Pact in Belgium of roughly the same date, the dramatic influx of new parties to
Parliament in Norway and Denmark in 1972-13. In terms of our own data the
prevalence of the New Politics dimension may be a covert indicator of change over
time, as these issues become prevalent in the late sixties and seventies. Of course
we can show it as a dimension over the whole postwar but it might be more accurate
to represent it as creating a different space.
To test the possibility, separate factor analyses were run of the
documentary material before and after a break-point identified for each country in
terms of historical events. The results are summarised in Table 7. Obviously some
caution needs to be exercised since breaking the postwar into two periods attenuates
the number of cases for factor analysis quite seriously: some simply cannot be done.
However a general impression is that the Left-Right dimension is the leading one in
most countries both in the earlier and late periods. It emerges explicitly in the earlier
postwar period in seven out of ten countries shown in the Table. One also has the
impression from examining the analysis in detail that it would take very little to "tip"
dimensions given other interpretations (for example, the Secular versus Religious
clash in Belgium and the Netherlands) into a Left-Right confrontation, which is
presumably what happened in these countries anyway.
With the later period we find that the dimension emerges in some form in
six out of nine countries (very unstable solutions emerged for Italy which caused the
second period to be excluded from the table). No other general dimension emerges
to challenge it in the Table. It is certainly clear that there is no "end of ideology" in the
later period. On the contrary the entry of the "new politics", whether of the New Left
or Green variety, make for a reassertion of ideological conflict rather than a
diminution of it.
The basic finding from the methodological point of view is, that we are
justified in condensing these data into a single left-right dimension. This emerges
spontaneously as the leading, and only generalizable one, from the nearest we can
get, statistically, to a purely inductive approach, whether for the whole postwar or for
its earlier and later periods. Breaking the whole period into two substantially
increases the possibility of idiosyncratic and time-bound dimensions emerging, as
they can predominate over a shorter period whereas over the long term they are
likely to give way to the more enduring and stable organization of conflict underlying
them. This is not, of course, to say that using one or the other time period is "wrong".
Each is a summary which leaves out certain aspects of these quite complex data. I
have already noted that the Belgian dimensions could easily tip over into a Left-Right
form: this is what indeed, happened when the whole postwar period was analysed
together.
The Old Left and New Politics dimensions are reasonably related to each
other. The old Left-Right distinction opposes peace and disarmament, social welfare
and government economic intervention to economic freedom and orthodoxy,
traditional values and support for military alliances. The new Left puts less emphasis
on welfare and more on participation, democracy and rights of non-economic groups.
The Greens add to this their concern with environmental issues. None of these are
incompatible with old left positions, and indeed, might positively call for more
Government intervention and welfare support. So we can envisage a consolidation of
Left-Right opposition in the future rather than its replacement and indeed this seems
to have happened in the eighties after most of our data were collected.
An interesting additional point which emerges from Table 7 is that the "New
Politics" of environmental concern, protection of minorities, and greater participation
was already making its way in the first part of the postwar period. These concerns
were often carried by the New Left parties, particularly in Scandinavia. Issue change
was certainly not absent in the earlier postwar period as compared to the second. We
can examine this at a more specific level in Section 8.
8. SPECIFIC ISSUE-CHANGE OVER THE POST-WAR PERIOD
i) Changes in Programmatic Issues
Whether or not one thinks of issue-change primarily in terms of parties
changing position within the same space, or of the dimensions of the relevant space
themselves changing and in that sense imposing a qualitative change in
relationships, it is relevant to ask at a more detailed level what specific issues are
changing and how. This is also of concern to some of the non-spatial approaches
summarized in Section 4. Table 8 summarizes overall results in terms of change in
specific issues, from the same comparison of countries before and after a crucial
turning point in their postwar history.
The Table not only gives an overall judgement on whether change in
specific issues had taken place (in 6 out of 11 it had, up to the beginning of the
1980s) -it also identifies most of the issues which are rising or declining in
prominence or remaining stable. This gives us an opportunity to see if some issues
share the same fate across developed democracies, and thus to get some clues
about the factors that make for their entry on to the political agenda ("Agenda"
however, may be a misleading analogy for issues, as one gets the impression both
from party try-ons in their programmes, and from the way in which issues bob up and
down in elections, that they are never fixed enough to be on a definite agenda: it is
rather a process of constant change, and party competition to push others' issues out
and your's in).
It is difficult to generalize very much on the basis of Table 8. The same
broad topics clearly appear among leading issues in all countries, for example,
"social issues", "economic orthodoxy", etc. However, they do not show the same
pattern of rise and decline. In the Netherlands and Britain the attention paid to social
services (up to the early 'eighties) was stable: in Belgium it was declining, as also in
Sweden (but from a very high base there). Economic orthodoxy and free enterprise,
which in retrospect one might have expected to be consistently rising, were instead
declining in Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands, but certainly rising in Australia
and Denmark.
The few general tendencies which emerge are:
a) questions connected with traditional morality (which in party programmes
is more the virtues of the family and Christian values rather than the minefields of
abortion and divorce) are in general decline. This may reflect deconfessionalization,
particularly in the Netherlands
b) attention to agriculture is generally declining, reflecting the migration
from country into town which has taken place in practically all these countries
c) attention to the military seems to be declining to the early 'eighties (apart
from the United States) -running in parallel with the reduction of international
tensions. The difference between the United States, where the attention the topic
gets is stable, and other countries, is interesting because of course the U.S. was
more heavily involved in military ventures during the later period than its allies
d) along with the military and defence, there seems a general decline in
attention to international affairs in the later period, again perhaps reflecting the more
reassuring atmosphere as detente proceeded.
Issues to which more attention was paid in the later period are:
a) technology -rising in the US, UK and Italy and stable elsewhere
b) a cluster of "new politics issues" -democracy, decentralization, social
justice and environment- not always the same in every country but recognizably
related. The most consistent issue to enter in is the environment, although only in
Sweden does it jump to almost the most prominent role. Mostly the entry of new
issues is signalled by modest increases in attention to a topic which brings it to the
bottom of the leading ten.
There is a hint from the evidence on party programmes that issue change is
a function of economic, social and "external" political changes, particularly in
international affairs. This would be a reassuring conclusion as it would demonstrate
that parties do function as transmitters and debaters of real problems, which
governments may then be stimulated to take action on. It would be nice if it were so,
since it would buttress our faith in the ability of democracy to cope with contemporary
problems. There is, however, one piece of counter-evidence from the programmes
which we ought to consider; and two general points to make on the way in which the
"real world" gets reflected in issues.
The counter evidence is the general absence of references to the European
Community in most of the countries directly affected by it. Only in Italy and Belgium
does it appear as a rising issue. Perhaps, however, this is because it is not
controversial in many places -though this would not be true for Britain and Denmark
in the 1970s.
The reflection I want to add on the genesis of issues, is how far the
environment is really an "objective" problem creating immediate difficulties for people,
and how far it is an issue created by some scientists and the media. Objectively, in
the countries considered, most people probably suffer less, directly, from pollution
than in the smoke and smog-shrouded cities of 50 years ago. Yet it is clearly a
"rising" issue. Declining international tension is also not experienced directly -though
it is true that in the earlier postwar period wars were actually being fought. And
environmental change also seems to be a real process happening "out there", as well
as a subject of concern for scientists and media. The media do presumably, most of
the time, reflect the "real world"?
Another general aspect of issue-generation at the international level is the
effect of imitation and transmission. Although they may be insulated to some extent,
no national politics takes place entirely in a vacuum. In particular what is said and
debated in the United States has an enormous impact elsewhere -probably it is an a-
symmetric relationship. Thus it may be that the environment issue was touched off by
objective conditions in the United States where the big cities probably are more
polluted than 50 years ago; and then spread as an issue to Western Europe even
though the cities are cleaner than they were. Whatever the plausibility of this
particular speculation, there is no doubt that imitation and transmission effects need
to be reckoned with.
ii) Changes in Newspaper Accounts of Campaign Issues
Further evidence on the processes behind issue-change comes from
another study, of campaign issues mentioned by newspapers over 23 countries in
the postwar period, up to 1980 (Budge and Farlie, 1983, pp. 35-41). Codings here
were made on a different (though broadly compatible) categorization to those of
electoral programmes (also based on saliency ideas) into 14 broad categories,
including candidate reactions (see Table 3). They are not directly comparable with
the programmatic issues discussed earlier but do give an alternative estimate of
postwar trends to compare with them.
Table 9 first of all gives an overall summary of the issues that emerged in
elections over the whole postwar period within each country. From this we can see
(always constrained by the type of classification made) that the most widespread
type of issue which enters into the great majority of elections in all countries, in
nerwpaper terms, is government records. This is hardly surprising, since elections
are designed to choose a government and the most immediate ground for choice is
how well the contestants have performed in the past or seem likely to perform in the
future. The record has always been assessed primarily in economic terms but there
is an increasing concentration on this in the later postwar period.
In most countries government record is as predominating a concern as it is
overall. In Belgium, however, it enters into only six out of ten elections -buried very
often by the disruptive linguistic divisions of the 1970s. Switzerland is the other
country where government record is not prominent, but this is a reflection of the
absence of national issues from many Swiss elections rather than a downgrading of
government record in relation to other types of issue.
The personal characteristics of candidates (usually for the chief executive
office) enter into slightly more than half the elections. Again it is unsurprising that the
qualities of potential leaders should form such a widespread basis of assessment.
Being less widespread than government record, however, there is more room for
variation between countries. The United Kingdom, West Germany, India and Sri
Lanka have candidates entering as a major considerational into all elections, followed
by Australia (eleven out of thirteen), Canada (ten out of thirteen), Ireland and Israel
(nine our of ten) and the United States (six out of nine). On the whole it seems that
countries with a broadly Anglo-Saxon parliamentary tradition and tendencies to a
two-party system tend to focus attention on candidates (however, West Germany
does not follow the Anglo-Saxon tradition and Israel has not until very recently had
anything like two-party competition),. Democracies with least stress on candidates
are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Switzerland and the Low
Countries. These are on the whole the smaller North European countries, with the
significant exceptions of Italy and Japan. Perhaps the factionalism of the dominant
party in the last two countries prevents national leaders appearing as more than
nominees of special interests. The institutionalization of the parties, and traditions of
collective leadership in the smaller North European democracies, may inhibit
assessment through individual personalities.
Foreign relations appears as an important issue in rather less than half the
elections. It is particularly important in the United States -naturally, in a country at the
centre of a world system of alliances which has been engaged in two major conflicts
within the last thirty years. The United Kingdom (six out of ten) and France (there out
of seven) have been in a similar situation. Foreign relations are also important to
smaller countries next to a powerful threatening neighbour, such as Finland vis a vis
the USSR (eight out of eleven elections), West Germany (five out of seven), Japan
(six out of nine), India (three out of seven) and Norway (six out of eight). Iceland (six
out of twelve) and Canada (five out of thirteen) have been particularly concerned
over relations with the United States.
The last leading issue type again cropping up in nearly half the elections is
socioeconomic redistribution, at the core of which stand welfare policies. In Australia
these were debated in eleven out of thirteen elections, attaining almost similar
prominence in the United Kingdom (seven out of ten). They were raised also in more
than half the elections held in Italy, India and, rather surprisingly, the United States.
Elsewhere they appeared in a significant number of elections, except in Canada (one
out of thirteen) France (two out of seven), Sri Lanka (one out of five) and Switzerland
(no elections at all). Possession either of a Socialist party or strong two-party
competition appears to contribute to the raising of this issue, although the exceptions
indicate that the relationship is not strong.
All remainings issue types appear in the range between fourteen and
forty-five elections (i.e. between about 8 per cent and 20 per cent of the total). In all
cases, low general representation stems from their uneven distribution within
different countries. All are raised frequently in one or two countries, but do not
appear at all elsewhere. Thus civil order has been a recurring concern in France and
West Germany (three out of seven elections) and peculiarly -because of fears about
communist subversion- in almost a third of Australian elections. Constitutional
changes have been debated a great deal in Belgium (six out of ten elections),
primarily because of the need to conciliate Flemish speakers by bestowing greater
autonomy. Defence has been of particular concern in Canada, where it unleashes
tensions between francophones and anglophones, and towards the United States; in
Denmark and the United Kingdom debate has revolved around the overall level of
defence expenditures within a precarious economy. Religion has entered into
politics in Italy, Netherlands and Luxembourg through the Christian parties there and
in Sri Lanka through the fears of the Buddhist priesthood about its position. Ethnic
rivalry has dominated Belgian politics over the last ten years, and has emerged in
Britain and Israel through problems of assimilation posted by recent immigration.
Regional issues are related to ethnic tension in Belgium, while in Canada the
position of French-speakers is symbolised by the power of Quebec. Farming
problems are important to Finland, not only because of the relatively greater number
of the rural population, but because of the pivotal position of the Agrarian Party.
Nationalisation and associated powers of government control have been particularly
controversial in the United Kingdom, but also in Sweden, Norway and the
Netherlands, while its converse -an emphasis on individual freedom and initiative-
was prominent in Denmark even before the dramatic emergence of Glistrop's
anti-tax party in 1973. Government regulation has emerged in about a quarter of
elections in Finland, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, mainly in relation to
strikes. Since these are an endemic problem in modern economies, we may expect
this type of issue to become increasingly prominent in future. Even generally
under-represented issue types thus emerge as important for the analysis of
elections in at least one country.
Issue types vary not only across countries but over time -some recurring
more frequently in later elections, some declining in saliency. Table 10 traces the
incidence of issues in each election "period" of the postwar years. Such periods have
been selected simply to group contiguous elections, without any deeper theoretical
justification. They seem short enough to capture significant changes.
Government record is such a ubiquitous type of issue that no particular
trend can be traced; if anything it appears to have become an even more widely used
basis of assessment in recent years than formerly. The same can be said the more
strongly of candidates -from a third of elections in the late 1940s to three-quarters
since the mid-1970s. Foreign relations appear more sensitive, as one might expect,
to the state of international affairs -relatively more prominent in the late 1940s with
the Cold war, then in the late 1950s and early 1960s with detente, then from 1565 to
1974 with Vietnam and its aftermath. Socioeconomic redistribution appears in a
quarter to a half of the elections in each time-period, attaining most prominence in
the early 1950s during the first wave of postwar prosperity; and least prominence
more recently.
Of the less generally recurring issues, civil order comes to much greater
prominence in the politically disturbed periods after 1965, with student
demonstrations and terrorism. Constitutional issues come to prominence earlier, from
1955. Defence shows a rising trend to the early 1960s, and a slow decline thereafter.
Religious-moral questions remain at a low level throughout, with a slight peak in the
late 1950s. Reflecting the growth of separatism and autonomist movements in
Europe, and the increasing numbers of foreign workers in all countries, ethnic issues
show a distinct rise over the postwar period. Regionalism reached a sudden peak in
1965-74 but an indication of decline is seen in the thirty-three elections out of thirty-
six in which it failed to appear in 1975-79. Urban-rural questions, on the other land,
show no distinct tendencies, though they reached their highest in 1970-74.
The three non-redistributive class issues all show a tendency to grow in
prominence over the postwar years. The extent of government control (involving such
questions as nationalisation) as much debated during the postwar reconstruction,
slipped almost out of sight in 1960-64, then returned to prominence in the 1970s with
the breakdown of Keynesian approaches to economic management and the advent
of neo-capitalist modes of thought. A broadly similar pattern, though different in
detail, ca, be seen for the antonym of government control -individual initiative and
freedom. Regulation, increasingly discussed in relation to industrial unrest and
strikes, again rises sharply to prominence in the 1970s.
Most of these tendencies are understandable in terms of a postwar history
which in most countries involved initial reconstruction, followed by a relaxed
enjoyment of restored prosperity from about 1955 to 1965, succeeded in turn by the
increasing problems of a complex economy and intergroup tensions connected with
this (foreign affairs proceeding, meanwhile, from a consolidation of Cold War
alliances, through detente, to a concern with American involvement in Vietnam, and
further dissolution of previous alliances). That the appearance and disappearance of
election issues can be related to general tendencies, outside the control of politicians
in any one country, carries implications for analyses of campaign strategies. For if
politicians have only a limited ability to emphasise or deemphasise issues, which
become independently salient in elections, one can attribute only a partial influence
over victory or defeat to their actions. Rather than seeing their strategy as
determining the outcome, we must ask instead whether they made the most of their
appeal under given circumstances which they could not wholly (or perhaps even
substantially) affect.
The inference that salient election issues relate broadly to significant events
in the outside world and are not sham debating topics designed to divert attention
form real problems, is consistent with the evidence and is a cheering conclusion for
the democrat, if somewhat daunting for ambitious politicians.
iii) Future Research
It must be said that all the evidence reviewed above is inferential and highly
circumstantial. We look at changing patterns of issues (or more exactly, of various
categorizations of issues) and interpret them in terms of changing conditions in the
world around them. That is quite suggestive but can only be a first cut at the problem
of issue generation. Further efforts need to be made in regard to the systematic
collection of indicators of political and socioeconomic change (both national and
international) in order to relate them through regressions to changes in programmatic
content. This should answer more conclusively some of the questions raised by the
analysis reported here.
9. THE CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL ISSUES
Strictly speaking, the question of what effects issues produce is beyond the
remit of this discussion, whose major focus is on the way in which one type of issue
succeeds another. To leave it at that however is to leave many questions hanging in
the air. We should not after all consider issue change important did we not think it
carried further consequences for election outcomes, party strategies and government
activity. Each of these is considered briefly, in turn:
a) Election outcomes
There was a great debate in the field of American voting studies about the
extent of "issue-voting" compared to voting on the basis of "Party Identification", in
the early 1970s (reviewed by Margolis, 1977). This partly derived from the fact that
explanations of voting have to cope with two phenomena:
i) the large number of voters who vote t he same way from election to
election
ii) the smaller, but possibly increasing number who vote differently.
In many studies i) is associated with voting on the basis of a basic
identification with the party uncontaminated with issues and ii) with voting under the
influence of issues (cf, among many others, Pomper, Brody, Page and Boyd, 1972).
Obviously, however, one could associate both effects with issue voting. From both
spatial and non-spatial perspectives, if a party makes only marginal adjustments to
policy and voters do not substantially change their opinions, most of its previous
supporters will end up voting for it in the next election. Explaining all voting in terms
of reactions to issues is neater and more internally consistent than using one type of
factor to account for stability and quite another to account for change. All rational
choice accounts make issue based assumptions.
Budge and Farlie, 1983, made an attempt to develop a thorough-going
issue-based account of voting which (unusually) generated, advance predictions of
10 national elections which performed reasonably well. Current predictive "economic"
models of elections (Tufte, 1975, 1978; Sanders, Ward and Marsh, 1987, 1991) are
also, of course, issue-based though emphasising effects of only one type of issue
(economic). Thus, there seem strong grounds for assuming that issues have a
determining, if not exclusive, influence over election outcomes: and that election
change is the effect of issue-change.
b) Party Strategies
If this is the case then what parties do about issues strongly affects their
electoral fortunes and participation in government. The whole tradition of modelling
and spatial analysis which relies exclusively on issue spaces and issue effects
seems to be on the right lines. Above I have suggested one direction that such
analyses could take, in terms of saliency theory. As government record is itself a
major issue, what governments do in office will affect their electoral fortunes, and
vice-versa.
c) Governement Formation
Most models of coalition-bargaining have moved ever closer to using pure
policy-factors rather than office-seeking ones to explain government formation.
Recent research using election programmes to measure party policy positions and
government programmes to represent government policy, have given only limited
support to the idea that policy-proximity or strategic positioning in issue-space
provide a basis for coalitions. Of 10 different policy-based models tested (two
indirectly median-legislator ones) the most successful attained only a 50 per cent
success rate and 50 per cent efficiency rate over postwar governments in 12
countries. Moreover, party programmes related only inconsistently to government
programmes -only in 4 out of 8 countries  were there correlations of any magnitude
between the two (Laver and Budge 1922, Chapter 14).
d) Government Outputs
These negative results could be explained, however, by government
programmes not being good indicators of policies actually pursued by government.
Much stronger relations are discovered between parties' programmatic stands and
actual government outputs, as measured by percentage expenditures (Budge and
Hofferbert, 1990: Hofferbert and Klingemann, 1990). Parties in coalitions may well
affect outputs through their tenure of specific ministries for which they have a strong
preference linked to their particular policy concerns (Budge and Keman, 1990:
Chapter 4). Specific ministries may thus be an intermediate goal for parties as a
means to affecting policy outputs (Budge and Keman, 1990, Chapter 5). This
undermines established perceptions of ministries as interchangeable coinage
(Browne and Franklin, 1972) in favour of certain ministries having a particular value
for a party (Budge and Herman, 1978).
Besides saving the idea of a reasonably pure policy space as the venue
within which coalition parties operate, the more general findings on the linkage
between emphases in election programmes and the expenditures made by
Governments, support mandate theories of democracy (cf Downs, 1957) in which
electors choose between parties on the basis of their alternative programmes for
government; and parties carry through the programmes in office, thus effecting
majority or at least plurality preferences.
10. CONCLUSIONS
We have, therefore, the promise from this line of research of a totally
issue-based empirically-grounded theory of the functioning of party democracy, from
party strategies through election outcomes to government functioning. Not only does
this provide us with the prospect of a more exact and testable account of the
processes involved, it is also in line with philosophical and popular justifications of the
greater choice offered by democracy as a political system. It helps to emphasise the
importance of studying the emergence of issues along the lines undertaken here, as
they constitute the agenda for government action on societal problems at a particular
conjuncture.
All this underlines the basic importance of better definitions and measures
of political issues themselves, of their effects, and of the influences which shape
them and change them. It is this last aspect of issues which is currently the least
studied and yet potentially the key to the ability of democratic political processes to
respond to their environment and keep themselves and their populations going. It is
this which makes studies of issues and agenda-setting particularly valuable at the
present time, when vast new populations are turning to democratic methods of
tackling and resolving the major problems which threaten to overwhelm them.
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